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Abstract
We present a class of countable state space stochastic games with discontinuous payoff functions satis-
fying some assumptions similar to the ones of Nikaido and Isoda for one-stage games. We prove that these
games possess stationary equilibria. We show that after adding some concavity assumptions these equilibria
are nonrandomized. Further, we present an example of input (or production) dynamic game satisfying the
assumptions of our model. We give a closed-form solution for this game.
© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider two-person discounted stochastic games with countable state spaces
and one-step payoff functions satisfying the Nikaido–Isoda condition [10] used to study static
concave noncooperative games on compact convex sets in a normed space. Nikaido and Isoda
[10] assumed that the payoff functions, say u1 and u2, are separately continuous in players’
strategies and u1 + u2 is jointly continuous on the product space of all strategy pairs. Their re-
sult can easily be extended to mixed extensions of nonzero-sum games on compact metric. As
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The proof given in [10] is based on Schauder’s fixed point theorem and is essentially different
from standard proofs of Nash [8] or Glicksberg [7] using the best-response correspondences. The
methods of Glicksberg [7] can be quite easily combined with the Bellman equation in discounted
dynamic programming to establish a Nash equilibrium theorem for discounted stochastic games
with countable state spaces and continuous payoff functions [5,12]. The situation is different
when we deal with the Nikaido–Isoda case. In this paper, we observe that discontinuous games
of the Nikaido–Isoda type can be approximated by discrete games with finitely many pure strate-
gies of the players. This idea is applied to study noncooperative stochastic games and a new
equilibrium theorem in this area is established. We first study games with compact metric action
spaces and give an existence result in the class of randomized strategies. Next, we present a new
result on pure equilibria under some stronger concavity assumptions concerning the payoff func-
tions and an affine transition probability function. Our assumption on the transition structure in
our second main result is quite strong. However, there are some natural examples, inspired by
economic theory, where it is satisfied. It has an additional good feature. Discounted stochastic
games with affine transition probability function can be solved for Nash equilibrium in many in-
teresting cases. We demonstrate an example with a closed form solution. Finding Nash equilibria
in general models of nonzero-sum stochastic games (even with finite state spaces) is a very com-
plicated problem [6], especially when both players control the transitions. Our example shows
that the situation is easier in the case of affine transitions and the problem reduces to solving
some nonlinear equation.
2. The model
A nonzero-sum stochastic game is described by the following objects:
1. S is a set of states for the game and is assumed to be countable.
2. X(s) and Y(s) are the spaces of actions available to players 1 and 2 in state s ∈ S. We
assume that X(s) and Y(s) are compact metric spaces for each s ∈ S. We define:
D = {(s, x, y): s ∈ S, x ∈ X(s), y ∈ Y(s)}.
3. q is a transition probability from D to S. If s is the state at some stage of the game and the
players select actions x ∈ X(s) and y ∈ Y(s), then q(· | s, x, y) is the probability distribution
of the next state of the game.
4. ri :D → R is the payoff function for player i. It is assumed that ri is bounded and Borel
measurable.
We assume that the players make their decisions independently and that they know the entire
history of the game at every stage.
A strategy for player 1 is a sequence π = (π1,π2, . . .), where πn is a conditional prob-
ability πn(· | hn) on X, depending on the history of the game up to its nth stage, hn =
(s1, x1, y1, . . . , sn−1, xn−1, yn−1, sn), such that πn(X(sn) | hn) = 1. The class of all strategies
for player 1 is denoted by Π .
Let X (Y ) be the union of the sets X(s) (Y(s)). For any s ∈ S, by P(X(s)), we denote the
space of all probability measures on the compact metric space X(s). Let F be the set of all
transition probabilities from S to X such that f (s)(·) ∈ P(X(s)) for each s ∈ S. Then strategy of
the form π = (f,f, . . .), where f ∈ F , will be called stationary. Every stationary strategy π =
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(stationary strategies) for player 2. A strategy π = (π1,π2, . . .) of player 1 is nonrandomized,
if each conditional probability πn(· | hn) is concentrated at one point of X(sn). Similarly for
player 2. The sets of nonrandomized stationary strategies of player 1 and 2 will be denoted by
F0 and G0, respectively.
Let H = S ×X × Y × S × · · · be the space of all infinite histories of the game, endowed with
the product σ -algebra. For every initial state s1 = s ∈ S and any strategies π ∈ Π and γ ∈ Γ, the
probability measure Pπγs is uniquely defined on H according to the Ionescu–Tulcea theorem,
see Proposition V.1.1 in [9].
Then, for each initial state s ∈ S, any strategies π ∈ Π and γ ∈ Γ and the discount factor
β ∈ (0,1) the expected discounted payoff for the player i is
J i(s,π, γ ) = Eπγs
[ ∞∑
m=1
βm−1ri(sm, xm,ym)
∣∣∣ s1 = s
]
.
A pair of strategies (f ∗, g∗) is called the Nash equilibrium for the discounted stochastic game
iff for every π ∈ Π , γ ∈ Γ and s ∈ S we have:
J 1
(
s, f ∗, g∗
)
 J 1
(
s,π,g∗
)
and J 2
(
s, f ∗, g∗
)
 J 2
(
s, f ∗, γ
)
.
Before the formulation of our main result, we shall introduce some useful notation. Let s ∈ S,
f ∈ F , g ∈ G. We define:
ri
(
s, f (s), g(s)
)= ∫
X(s)
∫
Y(S)
ri(s, x, y)f (s) (dx)g(s) (dy)
and for any set C ⊂ S,
q
(
C | s, f (s), g(s))= ∫
X(s)
∫
Y(s)
q(C | s, x, y)f (s) (dx)g(s) (dy).
3. Main results
In the reminder of the paper we shall study two classes of stochastic games satisfying some
of the following assumptions:
(A1) For every s ∈ S, the sum r1(s, ·,·) + r2(s, ·,·) is continuous on X(s) × Y(s).
(A2) For every s ∈ S, the functions ri(s, ·, y) and ri(s, x, ·) are continuous on X(s) and Y(s),
respectively.
(A3) For every s, s′ ∈ S, q(s′ | s, ·,·) is continuous on X(s) × Y(s).
(A4) For every s ∈ S, X(s) and Y(s) are compact convex subsets of some normed spaces.
(A5) For every s ∈ S and every y, the function r1(s, ·, y) is strictly concave on X(s), and for
every s ∈ S and every x, the function r2(s, x, ·) is strictly concave on Y(s).
(A6) For every s, s′ ∈ S, q(s′ | s, x, y) is affine in x and is affine in y (separately).
Remark 1. Assumption (A6) holds if the transition probability is of the form:
q(z | s, x, y) = g(s, x, y)ν(z | s) + (1 − g(s, x, y))μ(z | s), s, z ∈ S, (1)
where ν, μ are transition probabilities from S to S and g is affine in x and y.
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is the set of integers and ν({z: z  s} | s) = 1 while μ({z: z  s} | s) = 1. If, for example,
X(s) = Y(s) = [0,1], then one may consider
g(s, x, y) = xy + x + y
3
c(s)
with c(s) ∈ (0,1), s ∈ S.
Now we are ready to formulate the first of our two main results.
Theorem 1. Any nonzero-sum countable state space stochastic game with compact metric action
spaces satisfying assumptions (A1)–(A3) has a stationary equilibrium (f ∗, g∗) in the class of
all strategies of the players.
Remark 2. Using the Bellman equation from the theory of discounted dynamic programming
([1,2] or [6]) one can say that (f ∗, g∗) is a stationary Nash equilibrium in the stochastic game if
and only if there exist bounded functions wi :S → R (i = 1,2) such that
w1(s) = r1(s, f ∗(s), g∗(s))+ β∑
z∈S
w1(z)q
(
z | s, f ∗(s), g∗(s))
= max
x∈X(s)
[
r1
(
s, x, g∗(s)
)+ β∑
z∈S
w1(z)q
(
z | s, x, g∗(s))]
for every s ∈ S, and
w2(s) = r2(s, f ∗(s), g∗(s))+ β∑
z∈S
w2(z)q
(
z | s, f ∗(s), g∗(s))
= max
y∈Y(s)
[
r2
(
s, f ∗(s), y
)+ β∑
z∈S
w2(z)q
(
z | s, f ∗(s), y)]
for every s ∈ S and wi(s) = J i(s, f ∗, g∗), s ∈ S, i = 1,2.
Assume that every space P(X(s)), s ∈ S, is given the weak topology. Then P(X(s)) is a
compact metrizable space, see Theorem II 6.4 in [11]. The set F of all stationary strategies
for player 1 is a compact metrizable space when endowed with the topology of pointwise con-
vergence. This is a simple corollary to Tikhonov’s theorem on the product of compact spaces,
see [13]. We remind that {fn} converges to f in F iff {fn(s)} converges weakly to f (s) in
P(X(s)) for every s ∈ S. Similarly, the set G can be recognized as a compact metrizable
space.
In the proof we shall use the following lemma, which can be treated as a counterpart of
Lemma 2.1 in [5] for our case.
Lemma 1. Suppose assumptions (A1)–(A3) are satisfied. Then J 1(s, ·,·) + J 2(s, ·,·) is contin-
uous on F × G endowed with the product topology and for every fixed f ∈ F and g ∈ G the
functions J i(s, ·, g) and J i(s, f, ·), i = 1,2, are continuous on F and G, respectively.
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J 1(s, f, g) + J 2(s, f, g) = Efgs
[ ∞∑
m=1
βm−1
(
r1(sm, xm,ym) + r2(sm, xm,ym)
) ∣∣∣ s1 = s
]
and by (A1) the function r1(s, ·,·) + r2(s, ·,·) is continuous on X(s) × Y(s), s ∈ S. Therefore,
the arguments given in Lemma 2.1 from [5] apply and J 1(s, ·,·) + J 2(s, ·,·) is continuous on
F × G. The remaining assertions follow directly from Lemma 2.1 in [5]. 
Proof of Theorem 1. To simplify notation we assume that X(s) = X and Y(s) = Y for every
s ∈ S. The proof is similar in the general case. Let X∞ = {xk}∞k=1 and Y∞ = {yk}∞k=1 be dense
sets in X and Y, respectively. Define
Xn = {x1, . . . , xn}, Yn = {y1, . . . , yn}
and
Fn =
{
f :S → P(Xn)
}
, Gn =
{
g :S → P(Yn)
}
,
where P(Xn), P(Yn) denote the sets of probability measures with finite supports contained in
Xn and Yn, respectively.
By Theorem 1 in [5], for each n, there exist (f ∗n , g∗n) ∈ Fn × Gn such that:{
J 1
(
s, f ∗n , g∗n
)
 J 1
(
s, fn, g
∗
n
)
,
J 2
(
s, f ∗n , g∗n
)
 J 2
(
s, f ∗n , gn
) (2)
for all fn ∈ Fn, gn ∈ Gn, s ∈ S. Since F and G are compact metrizable spaces, {(f ∗n , g∗n)} has a
subsequence convergent to some (f ∗, g∗) ∈ F × G. Without loss of generality we may assume
that f ∗n → f ∗, g∗n → g∗ as n → ∞.
Fix m, fm ∈ Fm and gm ∈ Gm. Since F1 ⊂ F2 ⊂ · · ·, G1 ⊂ G2 ⊂ · · ·, (2) implies that for each
nm we have
J 1
(
s, f ∗n , g∗n
)+ J 2(s, f ∗n , g∗n) J 1(s, fm,g∗n)+ J 2(s, f ∗n , gm)
for every s ∈ S, fm ∈ Fm, gm ∈ Gm. Passing to the limit as n → ∞ and using Lemma 1, we
obtain:
J 1
(
s, f ∗, g∗
)+ J 2(s, f ∗, g∗) J 1(s, fm,g∗)+ J 2(s, f ∗, gm) (3)
for every s ∈ S, m  1, fm ∈ Fm and gm ∈ Gm. Fix any k and choose arbitrary fk ∈ Fk. Since
Fk ⊂ Fm for each m k, from (3), we obtain that
J 1
(
s, f ∗, g∗
)+ J 2(s, f ∗, g∗) J 1(s, fk, g∗)+ J 2(s, f ∗, gm) (4)
for all m k. Taking the limit in (4) as m → ∞, we infer that
J 1
(
s, f ∗, g∗
)
 J 1
(
s, fk, g
∗) (5)
for each k and fk ∈ Fk, s ∈ S. Similarly, one can prove that
J 2
(
s, f ∗, g∗
)
 J 2
(
s, f ∗, gk
)
for each k and gk ∈ Gk, s ∈ S.
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vk(s) := sup
fk∈Fk
J 1
(
s, fk, g
∗).
Since Fn ⊂ Fn+1 for every n, {vk(s)} is nondecreasing. It is also a bounded sequence (recall that
the payoffs are uniformly bounded). Therefore, we can define
v(s) := lim
k→∞vk(s), s ∈ S.
By (5), we have
J 1
(
s, f ∗, g∗
)
 v(s), s ∈ S. (6)
From the theory of dynamic programming, see [1,2], we infer that
vk(s) = max
x∈Xk
[
r1
(
s, x, g∗(s)
)+ β∑
z∈S
vk(z)q
(
z | s, x, g∗(s))] (7)
for all k and s ∈ S. Using the dominated convergence theorem, it is easy to conclude from (7)
that
v(s) = sup
x∈X∞
[
r1
(
s, x, g∗(s)
)+ β∑
z∈S
v(z)q
(
z | s, x, g∗(s))]
for all s ∈ S. Since X∞ is dense in X, under our continuity assumption (A3), we get
v(s) = max
x∈X
[
r1
(
s, x, g∗(s)
)+ β∑
z∈S
v(z)q
(
z | s, x, g∗(s))] (8)
for all s ∈ S. Clearly, (8) is the well-known Bellman equation in discounted dynamic program-
ming with the transition probability induced by q and g∗, see [1,2]. Therefore from (8), we
conclude that
v(s) = sup
π∈Π
J 1
(
s,π,g∗
)
, s ∈ S. (9)
From (6) and (9) we immediately get
J 1
(
s, f ∗, g∗
)= sup
π∈Π
J 1
(
s,π,g∗
)
, s ∈ S.
The proof of
J 2
(
s, f ∗, g∗
)= sup
γ∈Γ
J 1
(
s, f ∗, γ
)
, s ∈ S,
is similar. 
In our second main result, we consider a subclass of games treated in Theorem 1. We make
some stronger assumptions on the transition probability and payoff functions, but they have some
application in economic theory.
Theorem 2. Any nonzero-sum stochastic game satisfying (A1)–(A6) has a nonrandomized sta-
tionary equilibrium in the class of all strategies of the players.
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mark 2, we have
J 1
(
s, f ∗, g∗
)= r1(s, f ∗(s), g∗(s))+ β∑
z∈S
J 1
(
z, f ∗, g∗
)
q
(
z | s, f ∗(s), g∗(s))
= max
x∈X(s)
[
r1
(
s, x, g∗(s)
)+ β∑
z∈S
J 1
(
z, f ∗, g∗
)
q
(
z | s, x, g∗(s))]
and similar equation for player 2.
Under our assumptions (A4)–(A6), the function
a(x) := r1(s, x, g∗(s))+ β∑
z∈S
J 1
(
z, f ∗, g∗
)
q
(
z | s, x, g∗(s))
is strictly concave on X(s). Therefore, the function a attains the maximum value on X(s) at
one point, say f0(s). From the above Bellman equation and strict concavity of a, it follows that
f ∗(s) = f0(s), i.e., f ∗(s) is the Dirac measure concentrated at the point f0(s). Since s ∈ S is
arbitrary, we conclude that f ∗ = f0. Similarly using the Bellman equation for player 2, and our
strict concavity and affinity condition, one can prove that g∗ = g0 for some nonrandomized g0.
Thus, we have a stationary equilibrium (f0, g0) ∈ F0 × G0. 
Remark 3. Our proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 show that the noncooperative static discontinuous
games satisfying the Nikaido–Isoda condition can be solved using finite approximations in the
strategy spaces. This fact was not observed by Nikaido and Isoda [10]. We have not seen similar
result in the literature on this topic.
4. An example
In this section we give an illustration of Theorem 2. The game presented here belongs to the
class of input or production games related to those studied by Diamond [4] in the static case or
Curtat [3] in the dynamic framework. Suppose that two players are sharing a production process.
In every period player i exerts some effort xi ∈ [0,1] in producing a good at a cost c(xi). The
utility of every player depends on some productivity factor s and increases as the parameter s
grows. However, the change of the factor over time depends on the behavior of the players during
the play and is stochastic. We now give a precise definition of this game and show how to find a
nonrandomized Nash equilibrium.
Assume that the state space S consists of the points i4 , where i ∈ {0,1, . . . ,8}. Let X(s) =
Y(s) = [0,1] for each s ∈ S. The actions of the players will be denoted by x and y, respectively.
The payoff or utility functions of the players are:
r1(s, x, y) := s(xy + x + y) − 3x2 and r2(s, x, y) := s(xy + x + y) − 3y2,
for every s ∈ S, x ∈ X(s), y ∈ Y(s). Note that the costs are quadratic and the players have
identical utility functions. Therefore, we shall look for a symmetric stationary Nash equilibrium
(f ∗, g∗) where f ∗ = g∗ ∈ F0 = G0.
Assume that μ is the uniform probability distribution on the set S1 := {0, 14 , 12 , 34 ,1}. Then
μ(s) = 1 denotes the chance of getting some s ∈ S1. Let ν be the uniform probability distribution5
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is of the form:
q(z | s, x, y) := s + x + y
4
ν(z) + 4 − s − x − y
4
μ(z)
for all s, z ∈ S, x ∈ X(s), y ∈ Y(s). Observe that (s+x+y)/4 is the chance that the productivity
factor will be in S2 (the good part of the state space) in the next period, given that s is the current
state and the players choose x and y. The players can increase the chance of getting a good
productivity factor but it is costly.
Since the game is symmetric, we shall look for a symmetric equilibrium, say (f ∗, f ∗) and
denote the common equilibrium function by w. Using notation from Remark 2, we should re-
member that w(s) = w1(s) = J 1(s, f ∗, f ∗) = w2(s) = J 2(s, f ∗, f ∗), s ∈ S.
Define
a :=
∑
z∈S
w(z)ν(z) and b :=
∑
z∈S
w(z)μ(z). (10)
Put
c := β(a − b)
4
. (11)
Consider the static game Gs , where the payoff function for player i is
pis(x, y) := ri(s, x, y) + β
∑
z∈S
w(z)q(z | s, x, y),
where x ∈ X(s), y ∈ Y(s). Using notation (11), we obtain
p1s (x, y) = s(xy + x + y) − 3x2 + c(s + x + y) + bβ
and
p2s (x, y) = s(xy + x + y) − 3y2 + c(s + x + y) + bβ.
Having in mind the characterization of a stationary equilibrium via the Bellman equations as
in Remark 2, but given for a nonrandomized symmetric solution, we are looking for some
(f ∗, f ∗) ∈ F0 × G0 such that (f ∗(s), f ∗(s)) is a pure Nash equilibrium in the game Gs for
any s and
w(s) = pis
(
f ∗(s), f ∗(s)
)
for all s ∈ S, i = 1,2. Assuming that c ∈ (0,1), we can easily show that
f ∗(s) = s + c
6 − s , s ∈ S.
Moreover, the common equilibrium function is of the form
w(s) = c2ϕ(s) + cψ(s) + η(s) + bβ, (12)
where
ϕ(s) = 9 − s
(6 − s)2 , ψ(s) =
54s − 14s2 + s3
(6 − s)2 , η(s) =
(9 − s)s2
(6 − s)2 .
For any function h :S → R, put
ν(h) :=
∑
h(s)ν(s) and μ(h) :=
∑
h(s)μ(s).s∈S s∈S
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a = c2ν(ϕ) + cν(ψ) + ν(η) + bβ (13)
and
b = c2μ(ϕ) + cμ(ψ) + μ(η) + bβ. (14)
Hence
a − b = d1c2 + d2c + d3, (15)
where
d1 := ν(ϕ) − μ(ϕ), d2 := ν(ψ) − μ(ψ), d3 := ν(η) − μ(η).
We have
d1 = 0.10519384, d2 = 2.105710997, d3 = 0.972287737.
From (15) and (11), we get
d1c
2 +
(
d2 − 4
β
)
c + d3 = 0. (16)
Assume that β = 0.95. The solution c∗ to Eq. (16) that we are looking for is
c∗ = 0.473122179.
We also have
μ(ϕ) = 0.282992349, μ(ψ) = 0.800459293, μ(η) = 0.1150311847.
After substituting these values and c∗ into Eq. (14), we obtain a solution b∗ = 11.1418507658
and b∗β = 10.5847582275. Summing up, we have obtained a symmetric equilibrium (f ∗, f ∗) ∈
F0 × G0, where
f ∗(s) = s + c
∗
6 − s , s ∈ S,
and
w(s) = J 1(s, f ∗, f ∗)= J 2(s, f ∗, f ∗)≈ c∗2ϕ(s) + c∗ψ(s) + η(s) + b∗0.95
for every s ∈ S.
Remark 4. The method used to solve the above example applies to games where the transition
probability is of the form (1) with μ and ν independent of S.
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